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We examine the record of cross-country growth over the past 50 years and ask if 
developing countries have made progress on closing income gap between their 
per capita incomes and those in the advanced economies. We conclude that, as a 
group, they have not and then survey the literature on absolute convergence with 
particular emphasis on that from the last decade or so. That literature supports 
our conclusion of a lack of progress in closing the income gap between countries. 
We close with a brief examination of the recent literature on cross-individual 
distribution of income which finds that, despite the lack of progress on cross 
country convergence, global inequality has tended to fall since 2000.  (JEL E01, 
E13, O11, O47, F41, F62)  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Few topics in applied economic research have received as much attention as the convergence 
hypothesis, over the last three decades. The hypothesis in its simplest form states that initial 
conditions have no implications for a country's per capita income level in the long-run. In 
practice, the hypothesis is often taken to mean that per capita incomes in different countries 
are getting closer to each other in some sense, which implies that poorer countries are 
catching up with richer countries. Conceptually scrutinizing and empirically testing this 
hypothesis became prominent with the emergence of modern growth theory in the mid-
eighties, as tackling this hypothesis was seen as an important part of the project of unlocking 
the mechanics of economic growth; as Lucas (1988) eloquently argued in his pioneering 
article “The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply 
staggering.” 
 
This review aims at providing a critical assessment of this substantive but elusive concept 
that has generated an extensive literature that is at the heart of growth theory, empirics and 
policy. What makes an old concept once again topical is the changing landscape of the global 
economy, the heterogeneity of growth experiences only recently being unraveled, and the 
emergence of superpowers that unexpectedly challenged what we think is possible and under 
what conditions.  
 
Given the vast literature on this topic it is important to clarify at the outset what this review 
does and does not do. While key ideas from previous work will have to be explained again, 
this review will place more emphasis on work done in the last ten to fifteen years, or that was 
missed, omitted or given less emphasis by earlier surveys. For example, in terms of 
conceptual framework we aim to emphasize papers which have a tighter connection between 
theory and evidence than has been the norm in the literature, or where predictions about 
convergence go beyond the neoclassical model. It should also be stressed here that while 
regional convergence is a large area in itself, the emphasis of this survey is squarely on 
international income convergence. Also, while examining convergence in other key macro 
variables, such as welfare and health, is as interesting and important our focus here is on per 
capita income convergence as we do not want to risk a further loss of focus. 
 
According to Maddison (2007) the industrial revolution and colonialism brought about great 
divergence in incomes across countries. Milanovic (2012) estimates that between the early 
1800s and 1950, the average per capita income gap between industrial and less developed 
countries rose from a factor of 3 or 4 to a factor of 20 or more. This divergence slowed after 
World War II, which also coincided with the end of colonialism. Since the early 1990s the 
pace of growth of income per capita in many developing economies has accelerated to 
unprecedented levels and is substantially above that in high income countries.  This wave of 
potential catching up behavior coincides with another key global fact: namely that in many of 
the same countries that have experienced rapid growth, the distribution of income has 
become more unequal because the share of top earners’ income has often risen dramatically. 
The same period has seen dismal growth in a group of very poor fragile states that have been 
unable to participate in the recent wave of country growth described above, owing to wars 
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and political unrest. It is unclear exactly how these developments have impacted the global 
distribution of income across individuals. Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009, 2014), for 
example, argue that world Gini coefficients and poverty rates have fallen since the mid-1970s 
while others such as Chen, and Ravallion (2010) find less evidence of poverty reduction and 
argue that there are important regional differences in the extent of progress.2  
 
The proposition that initial conditions have no implications for the long-run distribution of 
per capita income is motivated by the single stable steady state of the neoclassical model 
with a globally diminishing marginal product of capital.3 By contrast, models with constant 
or increasing returns can exhibit a multiplicity or absence of stable steady states.4 In the latter 
case, a country's long-run distribution of per capita income can depend on its initial 
conditions; for example, a model with a feedback loop from income to population growth 
that has a high population growth-low income steady state and a low population growth-high 
income steady state with countries being selected to move to one steady state or the other 
based on their initial level of per capita income. Against this background, a statistical test 
with a null hypothesis of non-convergence of and an alternative hypothesis of convergence, 
can be seen as potentially informative about the sorts of models best suited to the study of 
economic growth. 
 
The convergence issue has important policy implications because, if there is a single stable 
steady state, small scale policy interventions can be helpful to the extent that they hasten the 
transition of the poor countries to inevitable prosperity. However, if there are multiple stable 
steady states, then large scale policy interventions may be required to push poor economies 
from one basin of attraction to another. In such a world, small scale policy interventions that 
fail to push countries into a different basin of attraction will eventually be undone as 
economies fall back to the steady state associated with the basin of attraction in which they 
lie. In broad terms, a multiplicity of steady states can lead to the sorts of poverty traps 
discussed by Collier (2007) or the hypothesized middle-income trap studied by Eichengreen 
et. al. (2013). 
 
The plan for this review is as follows: We start Section II by demonstrating the key facts and 
patterns of per capita GDP growth across countries over the last fifty years. We consider not 
only differences in growth across countries but also differences over time with a view to 
getting a sense of the varied evolution of the per capita incomes in different subgroups of 
countries. In Section III, we first consider the definition and operationalization of the 
                                                
2 Sudhir, Segal, and Stiglitz (2010) contains several analyses of the measurement issues involved and the 
conclusions of this debate.  
3 Strictly speaking, something like the Inada (1963) conditions are needed to guarantee a unique stable steady 
state in this model. 
4 Azariadis (1996) and Galor (1996) present surveys of theoretical mechanisms that can produce a multiplicity 
of steady states. 
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convergence concept, before discussing the theoretical foundations of the catching-up 
process in the closed-economy neoclassical growth model and in a more realistic open-
economy model. Having examined different concepts and theoretical models of convergence, 
in Section IV we provide a brief summary of the tests employed in the empirical growth 
literature to estimate convergence. In Section V we briefly touch on econometric issues 
facing estimation of convergence, before turning to empirical evidence in Section VI. Given 
how vast the literature is on the subject we chose to focus attention to only a selected set of 
key papers from panel, time series and distributional approaches. Section VII concludes with 
our assessment of the evidence and a discussion on the lessons learned so far from this 
voluminous literature.     
 
II. PATTERNS AND FACTS ON GROWTH OVER THE PAST HALF CENTURY 
Context 
 
This section presents what are, in our view, some of the more important growth patterns and 
facts from the past half century. We concentrate on reporting differences in growth across 
countries but also differences over time. The objective is to contextualize in a very intuitive 
way, patterns of convergence, divergence, and other interesting growth dynamics using some 
very basic statistics and figures.  
 
While it would be unreasonable to claim that 50 years’ worth of data is nearly enough to 
draw out the main facts about long-run growth, we believe that this data can adequately and 
meaningfully reflect modern facts on growth.5 In this short period of time, by historical 
standards, the world has seen unprecedented economic progress that has spanned the globe. 
The past half century has witnessed large improvements in living standards across many 
parts of the world that have transformed the prevailing landscape of economic thinking and 
policy. From this perspective we aim to exposit some of the key growth trends that emerged 
over the past half century, as parsimoniously as possible.  
 
The analysis below is based on the Penn World Table version 7.1 (PWT 7.1) database, 
covering 182 countries over the period 1950 – 2010.6 This dataset has been the gold standard 
                                                
5 The identification problem discussed by Durlauf et. al. (2005, pp 622-3) is relevant here. 
6 The main contribution of the Penn World Table was to convert national measures of GDP and income into 
internationally comparable PPP estimates. This is done by collecting prices for the same or similar goods in 
different countries and deriving price indices that can be used to compare what people can actually buy. The 
massive undertaking of price collection, known as the International Comparison Programme/Project (ICP) is at 
the heart of PWT – see, Deaton and Heston (2010) and Johnson et al. (2013) for detailed discussions on 
methodological challenges facing PWT. The PWT has reported on eight rounds of data, starting in 1970 (for 
more details see the pioneering papers by Kravis, Heston, and Summers, 1978, and Summers and Heston, 
1980). There are other datasets we could use, most notably Angus Maddison’s historical GDP data but 
unfortunately that dataset, as extensive as it is in the time dimension, it only covers a limited number of 
developing countries.   
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of cross-country datasets and has been used extensively in the empirical growth literature, 
including tests of convergence – roughly 70 percent of cross-country empirical work is based 
on PWT, followed by World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), and the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) dataset placed a distant third. This is largely because the 
Penn World Table has managed to curb well-known measurement issues related to cross-
country comparability, through more than 40 years of continuous improvements in data 
collection and methodologies.7 
 
Global growth 
The world as a whole has experienced unprecedented economic growth over the last half 
century. Average per capita PPP adjusted GDP across the globe increased from US$4,155 in 
1960 to US$13,368 in 2014 implying an average annual growth of 4 percent (see Figure 1).8 
While hard evidence to corroborate this claim is at best patchy, there exists a consensus 
amongst social scientists that the past half century has been the most prosperous in terms of 
world economic growth and welfare. At the same time, growth has been uneven across 
countries and also across different time periods. We consider this heterogeneity as a defining 
feature of the modern growth experience as we take a closer look at country experiences 
across income and time next.  
Heterogeneity across geographical regions 
Table 1 reports average decadal growth rates in six geographical regions as commonly 
classified by the IMF and the World Bank (East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, 
Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, North America, South Asia, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa) during the period 1960 – 2010. Global growth was relatively stable in 
the 1960s and 1970s with all regions having positive average growth rates in the range of 
about 3–4 percent with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia that grew below 
2 percent per year.  
Growth rates in all regions experienced a significant decline in the 1980s, with the exception 
of South Asia, resulting in world growth taking a large dip. Latin America, Middle East and 
North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the greatest declines, with growth falling 
into negative territory. For these regions the 1980s was a “lost decade” but with the exception 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, these regions began to recover in the 1990s and 2000s.   
                                                
7 For the stylized facts presented in this section we consider countries with populations above 1 million, to 
exclude small states that are likely to follow unique growth experiences. The time horizon of our analysis below 
is 1960 – 2010 as the 1950s data is quite fragmented and mostly available for industrialized economies. Using 
the latest published version of the Tables, PWT 9.0 released in August 2016, does not change our assessment of 
cross-country trends. 
 
8 Global growth rates were calculated by taking the mean of real PPP adjusted per capita GDP growth across 
countries.  
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South Asia followed a different pattern; it continued the growth of the 1960s and 1970s into 
the 1980s but saw decelerating growth in the 1990s.  This was followed by a dramatic 
bounce back in the 2000s, during which it was the fastest growing region, recording an 
annual growth of 4.5 percent, something only seen previously in the 1960s in Europe.  
Notable also is Sub-Saharan Africa’s bounce back in the 2000’s after very poor performances 
in the previous two decades (see Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian, 2007). The strong 
performance of some African countries (such as Rwanda, Tanzania, and Botswana) had 
generated sentiments of optimism by some economists (see Miguel, 2009; Radelet, 2010), 
while others flagged the sharp rise in commodity prices as the main driver of this experience. 
Figure 2a provides an illustration of regional progress from 1960 to 2010 with South and 
East Asia showing remarkable improvements in per capita GDP while Sub-Saharan Africa 
fell behind (see also Figure 3). 
Heterogeneity across income groups and exporter type  
Table 2 presents average growth in three income groups – High-Income Countries (HICs), 
Middle-Income Countries (MICs) and Low-Income Countries (LICs) – along with a group of 
countries classified as commodity exporters.9 The data reveal that the three income groups 
followed distinct growth patterns in the past half century. 
HICs began as the fastest growing set of economies, with an average annual growth of 4.7 
percent in the 1960s, but have gradually become the slowest growing group in the 2000s, at 
1.7 percent annual growth. In contrast, both MICs and LICs saw growth deteriorate 
drastically in the 1980s, before experiencing a recovery in the 2000s.  Specifically, MICs 
suffered a severe reduction of average annual growth, from around 3 percent in the 1960s and 
1970s to a dismal 0.4 percent in the 1980s. They have since then recorded a strong recovery 
reaching an average of 3.4 percent in the 2000s. 
LICs, on the other hand, faced continuous decline every decade from, the 1960s to the 1990s, 
with negative growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s, before the surprising and unprecedented 
resurgence in the 2000s with 2.4 percent growth. Given recent growth successes, some LICs 
went from countries associated with disaster in the pre-2000 era to success stories in the post-
2000 era. While many policy makers and commentators have hailed LICs recent 
achievements, researchers are still trying to understand where this newly found growth is 
coming from. More broadly, during the 2000s we observe some convergence in relative 
income levels as MICs and LICs showed a considerably higher growth rates than HICs. 
Recent data unfortunately casts doubt as to whether this upward growth trend will continue 
as growth in many commodity exporting LICs started to decelerated as commodity prices 
declined sharply.  
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports average growth rates in each of the decade in our sample 
for commodity exporting group of countries including oil and precious mineral exporters. 
                                                
9 See Appendix Table A.1 for a list of countries in each grouping. 
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These countries had negative growth in the 1980s and 1990s, but saw a marked reversal of 
fortunes in the 2000s with commodity prices exploding during the same period – for example 
crude oil prices shot up from around US$19 per barrel in 2000 to over US$130 in the first 
quarter of 2008 before plummeting to under US$40 in 2016; similarly, the price of gold 
climbed from US$274 per ounce in 2000 to a record high of US$1,405 in 2010). 
Figure 2b illustrates the way that HICs and MICs have opened the gap that separates them 
from income levels in LICs. In addition, Figure 3, which plots per capita GDP in a few 
selected countries and income groups relative to that in the US, paints a similar picture.  
Figure 4 plots the growth rate over 1960–2010 against the 1960 level of real per capita GDP 
for all countries for which data exist in PWT 7.1. Different versions of this plot, which 
presents one of the most well documented features of cross-country growth experience, have 
appeared in many books and papers.  Some interesting observations are immediately 
apparent. First, countries early in their development process exhibit much more diverse 
growth experiences over the period compared to more advanced countries. Second, once 
LICs, MICs and HICs are indicated in different colors, catching-up behavior, in the form of a 
negative relationship between initial income and subsequent growth, is evident among the 
HICs. To some extent, this behavior is evident among the MICs but not at all among the 
LICs.10  
Figures 5 and 6 present estimated cross-country per capita income distributions for 1960 and 
2010, and standard deviations for the distribution for 1960-2010, respectively. Calculations 
in both figures used a balance sample of 110 countries for which data were available. 
Notwithstanding the crude nature of these two figues, they reveal some notable patterns. The 
good news from Figure 5 is that the median country income improved markedly between 
1960 and 2010, from US$2161 to US$6682 (in constant prices, a growth rate of 2.3 percent 
per year), as indicated by the rightward shift of the center of the distribution. In 2010, only 30 
percent of the countries had per capita incomes below the 1960 median providing some 
evidence of the transition of some low- and middle-income countries to higher income status. 
However, the figure also contains bad news in as much as the distribution of per capita 
income in countries around the world has become more disbursed over this period as the 
distribution elongated and became flatter. 
 
Figure 6 shows a continuous increase in the cross-country standard devations from 1960 until 
the mid-1990s followed by a notable slowing and reversal of this trend in the mid to late 
2000s. The implied ceastion of the rise in the cross-country dispersion of per capita income  
sits well with the narrative regarding the remarkable growth spurt experienced by many 
emerging market and developing economies since the mid-1990s ‒ a narative also consistent 
with the 2010 cross-country income distribution depicted in Figure 5. 
                                                
10 It is important to be mindful of De Long's (1988) criticism of Baumol's (1986) early observation of the 
different growth behavior in LICs, MICs and HICs on the basis of sample selection and measurement error bias.  
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Heterogeneity within LICs   
Table 2 also makes a distinction between, what are commonly called, fragile and non-fragile 
LICs, with the former comprising about 1/3 of the LICs. Fragile states are defined as 
countries facing political fragility, characterized by weak institutional capacity, poor 
governance and conflict.11 It is important to make this distinction, as there is significant 
variation in the experience between fragile states and the rest of LICs especially in the last 
two decades of our sample period. Concretely, there is a difference of over 2 percent annual 
growth between the two groups in the both decades. This relatively recent development is 
quite important because it highlights that while there is a lot of optimism over the most recent 
growth acceleration in LICs, aggregating their experience masks a large differential the 
performance of fragile and non-fragile states. The story that emerges is one of divergence 
within the LIC group. Put differently, the unprecedented growth acceleration observed in the 
LIC group as a whole over the past decade, after a long period of poor performance, masks 
the fact that only about half of these countries are contributing to the resurgence while the 
rest of the countries are stagnant.  
Top and bottom growth performers across time 
Table 3 reports the top 10 and bottom 10 growth performers for each decade in our sample. 
There are a number of observations that are worth making using this data. First, it is quite 
stunning how China moved from one of the ten worst growth performers in the 1960s (with -
0.32 percent annual growth rate) to claim the first place in the list of top performers in the 
1990s and 2000s (see Subramanian, 2011, for an articulate and convincing account of 
China’s rise to economic prominence).  The growth experience of South Korea which 
managed to make the top-10 list in three consecutive decades – 1970s, 1980s and 1990s – 
before slowing down in the 2000s was also very impressive. 
More broadly, Table 3 demonstrates the dominating growth performance of Asian 
economies. Since the 1970s almost half of the top 10 growth performers come from Asia, a 
truly remarkable achievement. On the other hand, some of the poorest countries in the world, 
many of them fragile states, continued to record negative growth rates decade after decade.  
The encouraging news for developing economies emerges in the 2000s when unexpectedly 
some LICs make the top-10 list for the first time in decades. Unfortunately, consistent with 
the very poor growth performance among fragile states discussed previously, Table 3 also 
shows that the bottom-10 list is mainly composed of these countries. 
Convergence of LICs to middle-income status 
                                                
11 We use the World Bank’s definition of fragility (see Appendix Table A.1 for the list of countries which 
formed the baseline sample of fragile states in the analysis). On a cautionary note, we are agnostic as to whether 
fragile states are growing less due to their fragility, or causality might go the other way around.   
9 
 
 
How many years would it take LICs to reach MICs income levels? To answer this question, 
we consider a scenario in which we assume that the average annual growth rate for each 
country in the past decade will prevail for the indefinite future. Then we calculate the number 
of years that would be required for each LIC to reach the middle-income threshold of a little 
over $3000. Table 4 reports these calculations and lists countries in ascending order of years 
to middle-income status. According to this simple approach, which is arguably quite 
optimistic in nature, Vietnam and Laos have almost reached middle income status while 
Moldova, Sudan and Cambodia are within reach in less than ten years. Countries in East 
Africa that exhibit strong growth rates nowadays such as Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda 
would need about three decades to reach middle-income status, whereas Congo, Benin and 
Sierra Leone are far behind, being a century or more away based on recent growth 
performance. This exercise serves as a reminder that huge cross-country income disparities 
are not likely to be easily mitigated, even under favorable assumptions.  
Episodic growth 
An important fact in the literature of economic development is that growth in many countries 
and particularly in LICs is highly episodic and characterized by periods of accelerated 
growth followed by sharp decelerations often leading to disasters. Figure 7a illustrates this 
claim by plotting the growth rate of each developing and advanced country in our sample for 
each of the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s against that in the previous decade.  The wide 
dispersion of these points around the 45-degree line reflects the unpredictability of growth 
from one decade to another. Figure 7b demonstrates that the instability of growth across 
decades is even larger in LICs. Over the past few decades, the typical growth rate for a LIC 
in one decade has generally been a poor predictor of its growth rate during the next decade, 
while many policies and country characteristics have beenmore stable (Easterly et al., 
1993).12,13 
The empirical literature on growth spells took off after Pritchett (2000) demonstrated that the 
growth process, especially in developing economies, tends to be episodic. Hausmann, 
Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), proposed a heuristic approach for identifying growth breaks 
while more recent research has focused on improving the methodology for obtaining growth 
breaks.  For example, Jerzmanowski (2006) estimates Markov-switching regressions to 
characterize four distinct growth regimes and transitions between them. Jones and Olken 
(2008) use the structural break econometric technique of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), which 
locates and tests for multiple structural breaks within a time series, to identify dates of 
                                                
12 The correlations coefficient in LIC growth rates for the 60s versus 70s is 0.011, for the 70s versus 80s is -
0.118, for the 80s versus 90s is 0.025, and for the 90s versus 00s is -0.212.	
13 While this type of growth nonlinearity is related to the existing theoretical literature on poverty traps, it is 
important to recognize that it is also quite different in that countries need not fall into persistent 
underdevelopment once they experience a growth down break. Rather, the experience has been that countries 
tend to grow in spells and even for the very poor countries growth is not constantly low but rather start-and-
stop.	
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turning points. Berg, Ostry and Zettelmeyer (2012) turn attention to the challenge of 
sustaining growth accelerations by searching for determinants of the duration of growth 
spells.  
Table 5 presents spells of growth accelerations and deceleration across decades using the 
methodology developed in Berg et al. (2012) and data from PWT 7.1. This table confirms 
that the growth experience in many countries is not smooth but rather erratic with the table 
featuring almost as many accelerations as decelerations. Both kinds of growth spell have 
been observed in all five decades in our sample, but the1970s are dominated by decelerations 
and the 1990s by accelerations. It is also evident that growth is most episodic in developing 
economies (LICs and MICs), with there being only a few examples of growth spells of either 
kind in advanced economies. In terms of geographical dispersion, countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are the most prone to episodic growth. This evidence suggests that whether 
convergence or divergence characterizes the long-run behavior of growth, the process is 
highly fragmented in developing and low-income economies.   
Based on these very basic facts, broad-based international convergence is hard to witness but 
there are countries that have enjoyed very successful convergence experiences. Those 
typically come from the middle stages of economic development, and mostly from South and 
East Asia, with notable examples being China and S. Korea - China managed a leap from 
negative growth in the 1960s to become the highest growing county in the world in the 
course of the next few decades, while S. Korea was propelled from low-income status to 
high-income status within the short span of 50 years. However, the majority of the poorer 
countries, mostly in Africa but elsewhere too, show no movement in closing the gap which 
has been increasing as more advanced economies grow at a faster pace (Figure 3). 
III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The convergence hypothesis is often taken to be the proposition that per capita incomes in 
different countries are somehow getting closer to each other but it is more precisely 
understood as the proposition that the long-run cross-country distribution of per capita 
income is independent of initial conditions. This was originally conceptualized in the basic 
Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model where, outside of the steady state, economic growth 
is driven by the accumulation of physical capital. As the marginal product of capital is 
diminishing, this accumulation should come to a stop so that, as a result, rich countries’ 
growth will slow, allowing poorer countries to catch up. Much of modern growth economics 
introduces other sources of heterogeneity, notably technological progress (both innovation 
and adoption) and human capital accumulation as well as differences in geography, 
institutions, and policy, which may slow down or speed up the process of convergence. 
In this section, we briefly review the theoretical underpinnings of convergence by providing 
a sketch of how dynamics should be thought about under the basic Solow model and other 
more modern theories. The section is then rounded off with “economically interesting” 
notions of convergence which fall into two logically distinct convergence concepts that are 
predominant in the literature: one suggesting that disparities between countries simply 
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disappear with time; the other advocating that convergence is inherently dependent on a 
given country's limiting behavior from certain initial conditions. This naturally leads to the 
question of absolute versus conditional dissipation of initial disparities. 
The original theoretical foundation of the convergence hypothesis is the unique stable steady 
state in the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model. This property follows from the 
standard conditions on the production function of a strictly diminishing marginal product of 
capital, that takes all values between infinity and zero as the capital stock rises from zero to 
infinity. Ignoring population growth and technological progress, in the Solow-Swan version 
of the neoclassical model with an exogenous saving rate of s, the growth rate of capital per 
worker, k, is given by ( ) /kg sf k k δ= −  where ( )f k  is the (intensive form of the) production 
function and δ  is the depreciation rate. The assumptions on ( )f k ensure that ( ) /f k k  
declines monotonically from infinity to zero as k  rises so that 0kg >  for small positive k  
pushing k  toward the single value of k , independent of the initial quantity of capital per 
worker, where ( ) /sf k k δ= .  This ensures the existence of a unique, stable steady state that 
is eventually reached for any initial 0k >  and it is in this sense that the long-run outcome of 
the economy is independent of its initial conditions.  
To move beyond the basic Solow-Swan model we can draw on growth and development 
accounting calculations showing that growth is driven by the accumulation of both human 
and physical capital as well as improvements in technology or total factor productivity. To 
fix ideas, suppose that the aggregate production function can be written as ( , )Y AF K hL=
where Y is GDP, A is the level of technology, K is the stock of physical capital, L is the 
labor force, h is human capital per worker, and F is a production function which we assume 
to exhibit constant returns to scale in its two arguments. Using that assumption, we can write 
per capita output as ( , )y AF k h=  where /y Y L=  and /k K L= . As in the basic Solow-
Swan model, the assumption of diminishing returns to the accumulable factors of production 
k  and h  yields convergence to a steady-state and the addition of the assumption of a 
common level of technology A implies that the steady state is common across countries.14  
The assumption of diminishing returns to human capital is justified by the observation that 
higher education is bounded from above and as well as by studies in labor economics finding 
that human capital’s contribution to income is diminishing (see, e.g., Becker 1994).15 
Nonetheless, as a voluminous literature has shown, this is not clear at all with respect to 
productivity improvements stemming from technological innovation and adoption (see e.g., 
Schumpeter, 1950; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Zeira, 1998). The assumption of a common 
level of technology is not innocuous but was implicit in much of the early convergence 
                                                
14See, for example, the exposition in Durlauf and Johnson (1995). 
15As a voluminous literature has shown, it is far from clear that this assumption is warranted with respect to 
productivity improvements stemming from technological innovation and adoption (see e.g., Schumpeter, 1950; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Zeira, 1998). 
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literature.16 As we discuss below, more recent work has emphasized the inability of some 
countries to reach the technological frontier as an obstacle to convergence. 
 
To go beyond the exogenous technological progress of the basic Solow-Swan model, we 
follow a very simple formulation proposed in Aghion (2004). In this model, a country's 
productivity A grows over time according to max( )A A Aλϕ
•
= −  where maxA is the world-wide 
technological frontier andλϕ is the rate of creative destruction (λ measures the productivity 
of R&D; ϕ is the R&D intensity, measured as the productivity-adjusted quantity of final 
output devoted to R&D). Defining max/a A A=  and letting g denote the growth rate of maxA  
yields (1 )a a agλϕ
•
= − −  as the differential equation describing knowledge transfers generate 
convergence to the global growth rate. Similar to the law of diminishing returns in the 
neoclassical growth model, as the gap between the country’s average productivity and the 
world-wide leading-edge,1 a− , narrows, innovations will raise productivity at a decreasing 
rate.  
 
Embedded in a version of the Solow-Swan model with technological progress, this setup 
yields 1( ) / [ ( 1)]kg sf k k aδ λϕ
−= − + −  as the rate of the growth rate of capital per intensive 
worker, /k K AL= . While this equation seems similar to that above derived from the 
standard Solow-Swan model, there are two drivers of convergence behavior here. As before, 
there is the declining marginal product of capital but, in addition, there is the adoption of 
technologies that propel growth by pushing the level of technology in a country toward the 
world-wide technological frontier. Perhaps more importantly, this model also admits the 
possibility of convergence club behavior. In countries where there are sufficiently high 
barriers to technological innovation or adoption due to, for example, corrupt institutions, 
poorly defined intellectual property rights, low supply of skilled workers, and credit 
constraints, (see Aghion et al., 2016; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005), ϕ  will be zero. Such 
countries will be left behind while those counties with positive ϕ  move towards the 
technological frontier, thus creating two groups of countries with group membership 
dependent on initial conditions. 
 
Despite its fundamental insights, the elementary Solow-Swan model suffers at least one 
potentially important drawback in the convergence context in that it is a closed-economy 
model while most countries, even some of the poorest and the smallest, have, at least to some 
extent, borders open to trade and capital flows. Some of the recent literature has introduced 
open economy growth models that consider trade and capital flows to be elemental drivers of 
globalization and growth. Examples of such models that consider the issue of convergence 
                                                
16Mankiw (1995, p. 301), for example, argues that for “understanding international experience, the best 
assumption may be that all countries have access to the same pool of knowledge, but differ by the degree to 
which they take advantage of this knowledge by investing in physical and human capital”. Romer (1993) offers 
a contrasting view.  
13 
 
 
include Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Ventura (1997), and Cuñat and Maffezzoli 
(2004), Oxborrow and Turnovsky (2016). Of course, in an open-economy growth model with 
perfect international capital mobility convergence would happen instantly because incipient 
cross-country differences in rates of return on capital would be immediately eliminated. To 
explain why we do not observe equalization of cross-country return on capital and therefore 
immediate convergence, we need to consider possible frictions in international capital 
markets that slow convergence or eliminate it all together. 
 
To exposit these ideas, we use an elementary open economy model from Obstfeld and 
Rogoff’s (1996) textbook on which allows for international borrowing and lending under 
credit market imperfections. In this overlapping generations model, a small open economy 
faces a fixed world interest rate r. Individuals in this economy live two periods, working only 
in the first period and earning wage wt. Individuals can borrow in the world capital market an 
amount bt  (up to a fraction η > 0 of their earnings). Savings is based on individual choice 
rather than being a constant fraction of income as in the Solow-Swam model.  
 
As in the standard neoclassical model, the equilibrium domestic interest rate rd is equal to net 
marginal return to domestic investment, ( )dr f k δ′= − . This rate can exceed the world rate r 
if the international borrowing constraint is binding. An individual at the first period of life 
maximizes the standard logarithmic utility function, Ut = log(ct) + θlog(ct+1), subject to the 
constraints kt+1 + bt+1=wt − ct  and ct+1=(1 + rdt+1)kt+1 + (1 + r)bt+1 where tc is the individual's 
consumption in period	 t	 and bt+1 is an individual’s assets abroad which are subject to the 
constraint  1t tb wη+ ≥ − .	  For simplicity of exposition, we omit the details of this standard 
maximization problem and proceed as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) with considering the 
three possible cases that are implied by the model for a country that opens itself to world 
capital markets after having reached its autarkic steady state.   
 
If rd < r initially, then the small open economy becomes a net creditor in the international 
capital market and rd converges to r in one period implying absolute and rapid convergence 
in the steady state. However, if rdt+1> r, the borrowing constraint will bind so that bt+1 = − 
ηwt which yields  
 
				 													 1 1
1
(1 ) (1 )
1 (1 )(1 )t t t t tDt
rk w c b w
r
η ηθ
θ θ+ + +
⎡ ⎤+ += − − = +⎢ ⎥+ + +⎣ ⎦
.                         (2) 
 
It is interesting to note that setting η = 0 the model collapses to one resembling a closed 
economy Solow growth model albeit with log utility maximizing agents (and noticing that wt 
represents savings out of output). Equation (2) implies that greater capital inflows from 
international markets would speed up convergence because easing the borrowing constraint 
would lower rd, thereby increasing the rate of capital accumulation. Letting kdss denote 
steady-state capital stock under constrained borrowing and kuss that in the absence of a 
borrowing constraint, one can show that kdss > kuss is the same as kuss <  
ϕ !!!!!ϕ +η𝑤!!where wss 
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is the wage of the agent in the first period of life in the unconstrained steady state. This 
condition offers an intuitive explanation of convergence dynamics in this model, as it states 
that if the individuals’ saving (wss) plus maximum amount possible from international capital 
markets are sufficient to finance kuss, then the economy will achieve convergence to the 
unconstrained steady state kuss. If, however, this inequality is reversed the economy will not 
ever converge to steady state kuss simply because the wage and maximum possible foreign 
borrowing would not be sufficient to finance kuss. In sum, this model demonstrates in a very 
tenable and intuitive way how market imperfections can deliver convergence dynamics that 
are compatible with the reality of more integrated global economy and consistent with 
evidence from the various empirical approaches that we discuss below.17 
 
These and other theoretical growth models provide a variety of sources of heterogeneity in 
long-run outcomes. The empirical challenge is to determine if that heterogeneity represents 
the long run-effect of initial conditions and so is at odds with the convergence hypothesis or 
if it merely represents cross-country microeconomic variation. An example of latter case 
would be something that can be conceived of as parameter variation in the Solow-Swan 
model, such as different exogenous saving rates, the removal of which would permit a 
common long-run outcome in the absence of differences in initial conditions. In the former 
case, the obstacle to convergence between two countries would be membership of different 
basins of attraction of the process describing the evolution of per capita income so that the 
initial conditions defining that membership have long-run effects. We now turn to an outline 
of the empirical convergence concepts that have been employed in response to this challenge. 
 
 
IV. CONVERGENCE CONCEPTS 
 
The most elementary convergence tests are the so-called β -convergence tests. Often these 
tests use a log-linearized version of the neoclassical growth model to motivate estimation of 
equations of the form  
 
log( / ) log( )t t ty y y uτ τα β− −= + +                (3) 
where 0τ > , α and β are parameters, and u is an error term. A test of the hypothesis 0β =
against the alternative 0β < is then construed as a test for convergence, as the neoclassical 
model implies that a country will grow more quickly the further it is from the steady state 
which is implied by 0β < . This approach to testing the convergence hypothesis has been 
widely implemented as a cross-section test for a group of countries as well as a panel test for 
                                                
17 In developing a theory of gradual adjustment of capital in an open economy, an alternative to imperfect 
capital markets model presented above is the model of convex adjustment costs to investment and Tobin’s q 
(see e.g., Battisti, Di Vaio and Zeira, 2016). 
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a group of countries over time. Durlauf et. al. (2005) contains an extensive survey of this 
literature and discusses at length its econometric and conceptual pitfalls. 
As a test of convergence as the irrelevance of initial conditions, such β -convergence tests 
require that initial income be a sufficient statistic for a country’s initial conditions. To the 
extent that initial conditions are also reflected in cross-country variation in α , these tests can 
have low power against non-convergent alternatives, a point originally developed in Bernard 
and Durlauf (1996). Several studies, among them Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Tan (2010), 
and Fiaschi et. al. (2018) have found that variables other than initial income (literacy, 
institutional quality, ethnic fractionalization, life expectancy, share of Catholics) are capable 
of defining groups of countries in which exhibit similar within-group long-run behavior but 
different across-group long-run behavior. Such results imply that initial income does not 
contain all of the information needed to determine the long-run distribution of a country’s per 
capita output. 
While the neoclassical model is the motivation for tests of the convergence hypothesis in 
early work such as Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Mankiw et. al. (1992), 
still earlier work such as Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol (1986) was motivated by 
considerations of technology transfers and capital flows from "leader" to "follower" 
countries.18 Under this view, countries that are further behind the leader are potentially able 
to make a larger leap forward and grow relatively faster than the leader as they catch up. This 
is a potentially important driver of convergence, and Sachs and Warner (1995) cite a lack of 
openness as major obstacle to development and hence convergence. Delong and Dowrick 
(2003) argue that while periods of increased globalization such as those prior to WW1 and 
after WW2 tended to foster convergence in that the "convergence club" tended to grow in 
these periods, the effects were far from universally felt. They note that many countries were 
unable to join the club or, if they did, were unable to maintain foothold in it. They reexamine 
Sachs and Warner's estimates of the effect of openness on growth and conclude that while 
openness does promote growth, the benefits of doing so seem to have declined since 1980.19   
Following Barro (1991) and Mankiw et.al. (1992), equation (3) is sometimes augmented with 
a term such as 'λ x , where λ is a vector a parameters and x is a vector of conditioning 
variables that determine the steady state value of output per capita – variables such as rates of 
physical and human capital accumulation and population growth as well as a wide variety of 
                                                
18 While not concerned primarily with the convergence hypothesis per se, another early study, Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985), include initial income levels in their growth regressions motivated by the neoclassical model 
and note the catching-up implications of the negative estimated coefficient. As they point out, Barro (1984, 
pp288-94) studies graphically the catching-up behavior of a small group of industrialized countries in the post-
war period. See also Marris (1982). 
19 Alesina et. al. (2005) find that openness and country size are substitutes in promoting growth. Di Vaio and 
Enflo (2011) discuss the literature on theoretical and empirical motivations for range of possible effects of 
globalization on the cross-country distribution of income. 
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others.20 In this case, countries are assumed to have different steady states only because of the 
microeconomic variation controlled for by the inclusion of x and a negative estimated value 
of β is taken as evidence that each is converging to its particular steady state. Such tests are 
called tests of "conditional convergence" to distinguish them from tests of "absolute 
convergence" based on equation (3).21 
The implication of this finding of conditional convergence is that a poor country can be made 
to converge to prosperity simply by adopting the value of x of a rich country. Dowrick and 
DeLong (2003, p. 204) describe the presumption that a poor country could do this as the 
“joker in the deck” arguing that “a moment’s thought will convince anyone that many of the 
right-hand-side variables used by Barro (1996) could never be brought to the mean values 
found in the industrial core of the world economy in any country that has not already attained 
the productivity level and socioeconomic structure found in the industrial core.” There is 
another critique of the conditional convergence concept that is a bit more technical in 
character yet equally powerful: If indeed per capita GDP converges to different steady states, 
then the income distribution itself should converge to a limit distribution, which is not 
consistent with the evidence presented in the empirical section above. For these reasons, we 
mostly consider the absolute version of the convergence in this article.  
While divergence is an obvious alternative to convergence, another economically interesting 
possibility is club convergence, in which groups of countries with similar initial conditions 
exhibit similar long-run outcome so that, for example, the cross-country distribution of per 
capita income can have two or more peaks as found by Quah (1993). This can reflect a law of 
motion for the evolution of output per capita that has more than one stable steady state as can 
occur in a model with a feedback loop from income to some other state variable. In such 
cases, club convergence can occur as economies converge to the steady state associated with 
the basin of attraction in which they begin. A country's long-run per capita income will then 
depend on its initial conditions as measured by the state variables determining its basin of 
attraction with countries having similar initial conditions having similar long-run per capita 
income and so forming a convergence club.  
                                                
20 The inclusion of these variables raises important concerns about endogeneity as discussed by Cho (1996), 
Temple (1999), Easterly (2004), Durlauf et. al. (2005), Rodrik (2012), and Lenkoski et al. (2014), among 
others. 
21 While Mankiw et. al. (1992) derive a set of x variables from a version of the Solow growth model, economic 
theory is largely silent with respect to the set of variables to be included. As a result, empirical studies often 
abuse the resulting flexibility for selecting among the potential candidates. So much so that Durlauf and Quah 
(1999) report that over 90 different variables have been used despite the fact that no more than 120 country 
observations were available for the regression analysis using early versions of Penn World Data (version 4.0). 
This was part of the motivation for the literature aimed at eliminating model uncertainty (see, e.g., Levine and 
Renelt, 1992; Raftery, 1995; Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin, 2000; Fernandez, Ley and Steel, 2001; 
Brock and Durlauf, 2001, Ley and Steel, 2009; Eicher et al. 2011; Leamer, 2016a.b). One of the key findings of 
this literature is that the initial per capital GDP level is the most effective of all variables tried in explaining 
growth. 
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Bernard and Durlauf (1996) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995) have argued that the β -
convergence tests have that low power against this type of alternative with the latter paper 
finding that the club convergence hypothesis is consistent with the Mankiw et. al. (1992) 
data. Following Quah (1993) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995) a large group of authors have 
examined the convergence hypothesis using methods that have club convergence as the 
alternative hypothesis. Some of this research follows Quah and studies the dynamics of the 
entire cross-country distribution of per capita income while other researchers have used a 
variety of clustering approaches to divide their samples into groups of counties that represent 
putative convergence clubs because of similarities in initial conditions.  
The absence of a role for initial conditions in long-run outcomes implies that contemporary 
differences in per capita incomes are transitory suggesting that the dispersion of per capita 
incomes across economies should fall if convergence is occurring. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
(1992) refer to this notion as σ -convergence which is said to occur between t and t τ+  if 
2 2
t t τσ σ +>  where 2tσ  is the cross-country variance of ty . While β -convergence is not 
sufficient for σ -convergence as shocks can cause 2tσ  to be constant or increase over time, 
even if β -convergence is occurring, Young, et. al. (2008) show that β -convergence is 
necessary for σ -convergence. Friedman (1992), Quah (1993) and Hart (1995) caution 
against committing Galton's fallacy as β -convergence may be observed even if there is a 
constant, or even increasing, variance between two points in time. Accordingly, Friedman 
(1992), Hart (1995), Lichtenberg (1994), and Carree and Klomp (1997), emphasize that tests 
for convergence should investigate whether the variance indeed decreases between two 
points in time, i.e. whether there is σ-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
A different approach is taken by Bernard and Durlauf (1995, 1996) who offer definitions of 
convergence based on the time series behavior of output. They represent the idea that initial 
conditions have no implications for a country's per capita income level in the long-run by 
saying that two countries converge if the current long-run forecasts of their log per capita 
income levels are equal.22 That is, if  
    ( ), ,lim 0i t T j t T tT E y y F+ +→∞ − = ,                 (4) 
where ,i ty denotes the log of per capita income in country i  at time t and Fτ  denotes the 
history of ,i ty  and ,j ty up to timeτ . This definition implies that the deviation between the 
two counties is expected to decrease: ( ), , , ,i t T j t T t i t j tE y y F y y+ +− < − for some T when
, ,i t j ty y> , so that convergence can be thought of as “catching up” also in the time series 
                                                
22 This equality holds as the absence of a role for initial conditions in determining the long-run distributions of 
per capita output in two countries implies that the two countries will have identical limiting distributions of per 
capita output. See Durlauf et. al. (2005) for details. 
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context. As definition (4) implies the absence of stochastic or deterministic trends in the 
cross-country difference of log per capita income levels, convergence has often been tested in 
the time series context by testing the stationarity of that difference.  For countries with log of 
per capita income obeying integrated processes this test can implemented as a test of the 
cointegration of country pairs of ,i ty  and ,j ty with cointegrating vector [1, -1].  Applied to a 
group of such countries, this notion of convergence implies that the log per capita income 
levels are generated by a process with a single stochastic trend although that alone is not 
sufficient to imply convergence in the sense of definition (4) above. Bernard and Durlauf 
(1995) conclude that, while the number of common trends among 15 industrialized countries 
over the period 1900-1987 is small, it exceeds one and so they can not reject the null 
hypothesis of no convergence despite De Long's (1988) acknowledged observation that use 
of this sample ought to bias the results towards a finding of convergence. As we describe 
later on, there have arisen variations of this time-series approach to convergence. 
  
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
This section visits the recent evidence on the convergence hypothesis. While we focus on the 
research of the last decade or so that has examined the hypothesis using cross-country data 
rather than data on regions as economic units, earlier work is briefly mentioned in places to 
provide appropriate context.23   
Linear models 
The early contributions to the convergence literature estimate versions of equation (3) above 
and test for a negative β , or equivalently, a negative correlation between initial per capita 
income and its subsequent growth rate. Baumol (1986), Barro (1991), Dowrick (1992), and 
others fail to find a negative correlation when the sample is a broad group of countries, 
implying a rejection of the absolute convergence hypothesis.  
A striking result by Rodrik (2013) regarding unconditional convergence suggests that unlike 
economies as a whole, manufacturing industries exhibit strong unconditional convergence in 
labor productivity. The result holds at various levels of disaggregation for a large sample 
covering more than 100 countries over recent decades. Rodrik’s interpretation of this result is 
that sustaining growth requires active policies that promote economic diversification and 
structural change from low-productivity activities to mostly tradable higher-productivity 
activities. The challenge is then to identify these automatic-convergence industries in each 
country and to expand domestic employment around these high-productivity industries. Of 
course, as Rodrik readily admits in several of his recent writings on growth and convergence 
                                                
23 Earlier discussions and examinations of the convergence hypothesis can be found in review articles such as 
Temple (1999), Islam (2003), and Abreu et al. (2005), the Handbook of Economic Growth Volumes I and II by 
Aghion and Durlauf (2005, 2014, respectively), and in various textbooks including Grossman and Helpman 
(1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Jones (1998); Aghion and Howitt (2009), and Acemoglu (2011). 
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(2011, 2013, 2014, 2015), the problem is that mobilizing the productive sectors most often 
requires hard economic choices and even harder political decisions that rarely amount to 
what is necessary to get structural change going in many developing economies and 
especially in LICs. 
Abramovitz (1986) emphasized that 'Social Capabilities' including the ability to absorb 
existing technologies, and to attract capital are prerequisites and must be in place in an 
economy before catch-up growth can take place. Contributions such as Barro (1991), Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Dowrick (1992), and Mankiw et. al., (1992), show that the addition 
of conditioning variables such as rates of capital accumulation, population growth rates, and 
policy variables renders a statistically significant negative partial correlation between initial 
per capita income and its subsequent growth rate, evidence consistent with the conditional 
convergence hypothesis. Notably, Mankiw et. al. (1992) was the first contribution to derive 
the set of conditioning variables from an explicit growth model. Indeed, the foundational 
papers by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al. (1992) initiated a huge literature 
attempting to empirically test the extent of conditional β -convergence in various contexts.  
A likely influential culprit impeding nations from converging, is openness to international 
markets. According to Sachs and Warner (1995),24 convergence is not occurring everywhere 
because of the closed economic policy of some developing countries. According to these 
authors “…open economies tend to converge, but closed economies do not. The lack of 
convergence in recent decades results from the fact that the poorer countries have been 
closed to the world.” The original results obtained by these studies were generally affirmed 
by studies using panel data such as Islam (1995) and Caselli et. al. (1996). Subsequent 
contributions also introduced various adjustments to the original estimation strategy 
including a spatial dimension (see e.g. Baumont et al., 2003 or Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 
2006), to mitigate concerns that the omission of space from the analysis of the β -
convergence process could produce biased results.  
As pointed out by Sala-i-Martin (1996), one of the striking results obtained in these studies is 
the speed of convergence with which economies converge to their steady-state, is roughly 2 
percent a year. To this day, the 2 percent convergence rate continues to make headlines. For 
example, in recent work Barro (2015) shows that in a panel of countries panel since 1960 the 
estimated annual convergence rate for GDP is 1.7 percent, conditional on various explanatory 
variables. With data starting in 1870, he estimates the convergence rate at 2.6 percent; 
therefore, combining the two estimates Barro calculates conditional convergence close to 
what he calls the ‘iron-law’ rate of around 2 percent (see also Lee, 2016, who considers 
convergence in the context of Chinese growth experience).  
                                                
24 A Google Scholar search reports 5628 citations of this paper as of October 2016. 
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Similarly, the restriction of the sample to a group of sufficient similar countries such as the 
industrialized countries (Abramovitz, 1986; Baumol, 1986; Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989) or 
the individual states of the United States (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992) also yields a 
negative correlation between initial per capita income and its subsequent growth rate. 
Importantly, DeLong (1988) points out that Baumol's finding of convergence in a group of ex 
post successful countries may reflect sample selection issues as unsuccessful countries that 
have thus not converged were excluded from the group of countries studied in Madison 
(1982), the source of Baumol's data.  
Bernard and Durlauf (1996) question the power of the β-convergence test based on equation 
(3) and argue that rejection of the null hypothesis that β = 0 in favor of the alternative that 
0β <  is likely, even if the data are generated by a model with multiple steady states. This 
means that, even if the data are generated by a model in which countries follow locally linear 
but globally nonlinear laws of motion, the standard β-convergence test may still lead a 
researcher to conclude that convergence to a single steady state is occurring. In other words, 
the standard test has relatively low power against the alternative of multiple steady states.  
To improve the power of the β-convergence test against this alternative, Durlauf and Johnson 
(1995) use the regression tree method of Brieman et. al (1984) to estimate a version of the 
human-capital-augmented Solow growth model introduced by Mankiw et. al. (1992) that 
allows (endogenously determined) subgroups of countries to obey different growth 
equations. They show that such a model fits the Mankiw et. al. (1992) data better than the 
linear model used by those authors. This finding is consistent with the view that there are 
multiple basins of attraction in the process describing the evolution of output per capita. In 
this case, initial conditions (the determinants of which basin each country belongs) rather 
than just cross-country variation in the variables that determine the steady state in the Solow 
model, may be necessary to explain long-run differences in cross-country growth behavior.  
Nonlinear models 
A desire to model the potential deviations from β-convergence and improve upon tests of it 
based on equation (3) has given rise to a variety of nonlinear models as they admit the 
economically-interesting possibilities of divergence and club convergence. The possibility 
that different subsamples might display behavior consistent with different long-run outcomes 
had been considered as early as Baumol (1986) who divides his sample into the industrialized 
countries, the centrally planned economies and the rest (depending on their status in 1950) to 
explore the possibility of nonlinearities in the relationship between initial income per capita 
and subsequent growth and so the implied existence of more than one “convergence club”. 
Other examples of exogenous sample splitting include Baumol and Wolff (1988), Grier and 
Tullock (1989) and Dowrick (1992) all of whom find evidence consistent heterogeneous 
behavior across different subsamples in their data.  
Many other papers have considered a wide variety of nonlinearities using an equally wide 
variety of statistical models. We consider them in three not entirely distinct groups: a) 
models that cluster the data into groups of countries that obey common models; b) models 
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with smoothly varying parameters so that while a continuous equation describes the data the 
equation is non-linear; and c) methods that consider the shape and evolution of the cross-
country distribution of per capita income. 
Models with smoothly varying parameters 
This approach to parameter heterogeneity permits the parameters of the growth regression to 
vary smoothly across countries. Again, Baumol and Wolff (1988) provide an early example 
by allowing the coefficient on initial income to vary with its square and find that the negative 
coefficient required by the catch-up hypothesis is evident only for higher values of initial 
income. Chatterji (1992) estimates a cubic relationship between (the log of) income per 
capita (relative to its level in the US) in 1985 and that in 1960, and concludes that the implied 
nonlinear difference equation for relative income has two basins of attraction with countries 
belonging to one or the other (and hence displaying divergent long-run behavior) depending 
on whether or not their initial income per capita is greater or less than about 1/6 of the US 
value.  
Liu and Stengos (1999) estimate a semi-parametric additive partially linear growth regression 
that allows the coefficients on a measure of human capital accumulation and initial income to 
vary smoothly with the levels of the respective variables and, like Baumol and Wolff (1988), 
they find that the coefficient on initial income is negative only for higher values of that 
variable.  
Arguing that the “homogeneity assumptions” imposed on growth regressions were not 
envisaged by the original crafters of the theory on which they are based, Durlauf et. al. 
(2001) extend the approach of Liu and Stengos (1999) to allow all of the coefficients of the 
growth regression implied by the augmented Solow model of Mankiw et.al. (1992) to vary 
with initial income, so that while the model is locally (i.e. for any value of initial income) 
Solow, globally it (potentially) exhibits parameter heterogeneity. This extension confirms the 
finding that the coefficient on initial income is negative only for higher values of initial 
income, and also reveals strong evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the parameters 
relating the Solow variables to economic growth.  Henderson (2010) proposes estimation of 
the density of the coefficient on initial income in a nonparametric growth regression, and 
finds a multimodal density with a mode centered on negative values of β  and two others 
centered on positive values, implying β -convergence for some countries (identified as the 
OECD) but not for most. The evidence on heterogeneity is further strengthened by Kourtellos 
(2011) who allows the coefficients to depend on initial literacy and initial life expectancy. 
Related work includes Banerjee and Duflo (2003), Ketteni et. al. (2007a, 2007b), Minier 
(2007a, 2007b), and Sirimaneetham and Temple (2009) all of which find evidence of 
nonlinear relationships between growth and its determinants.  
Nonparametric estimation methods provide a way to investigate the existence and nature of 
nonlinearities without the need to specify the variables that govern parameter heterogeneity, 
as is the case for the partially linear regression model. Maasoumi at. al. (2007) use a 
nonparametric local linear estimator to estimate growth regressions with the “Solow 
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variables” on the right hand side for both OECD and non-OECD samples.  They find 
considerable variation in the relationships between growth and its determinants across the 
two samples, as well as in deviations from linearity within each sample. Owen et. al. (2009) 
estimate a finite mixture model for the conditional distribution of growth rates and conclude 
that the growth process is characterized by multiple regimes with institutional quality being 
an important determinant of which countries obey which regimes. Henderson, et.al. (2012) 
employ nonparametric estimation of regression functions in the presence of ‘irrelevant’ 
regressors with results that underscore the importance of nonlinearities in growth regressions. 
 
Distributional models 
Critical of the fact that the existing methods of studying convergence considered only a few 
moments of the distribution of output per capita, Quah (1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1996a, 1996b, 
1996c, 1997) pioneered the “distribution dynamics” approach to studying the role of 
nonlinearities in economic growth. These methods originally employed Markov chains to 
study the evolution of the cross-country distribution of income per capita but the required 
discretization of the state space of a continuous random variable (typically per capita income) 
changes the probabilistic properties of the data and more recent applications employ almost 
exclusively continuous state space methods. This body of research has found substantial 
evidence of convergence clubs when data from a large group of countries is used.25 Quah’s 
work demonstrated the existence of “twin peaks” in the long-run cross-country income 
distribution – two modes, indicative of two basins of attraction in the growth process.  
Henderson et. al. (2008) confirm the multimodality of the cross-country distribution of per 
capita output using a variety of measures of the concept and a variety of statistical tests.26    
More recent work has suggested the existence of more than two basins of attraction.27 Pittau 
et. al. (2010) point out that multimodality is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence 
                                                
25 A selection of the research applying and extending Quah’s ideas, in addition to the research cited in Durlauf 
et. al. (2005), includes Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003, 2007), Fotopoulos (2006, 2008), Maasoumi et. al. (2007), 
Fischer and Stumpner (2008), and Bandyopadhyay (2011). 
26 Several authors, including Beaudry et. al. (2005), Johnson (2005), Feyrer (2008), Barseghyan and DiCecio 
(2011), and Badunenko et. al. (2013) have sought the proximate causes of the shape of the cross-country 
distribution of per capita and its changes but there is no apparent consensus regarding the relative importance of 
cross-country variation in total factor productivity (TFP) or physical or human capital accumulation. Battisti 
et.al (2016) extend the conditional β -convergence approach by modelling the technology adoption of each 
country and relaxing the assumption that all countries follow the global technology frontier. While they find 
that output per worker in each country converges to its own productivity path, they conclude that many 
countries are diverging from the global technology frontier which, they suggest, is an important source of the 
lack of convergence in cross-country income levels. See also Comin and Mestieri (2018).  
 
27 Krause (2016) uses the critical bandwidth (the largest bandwidth allowing for a finding of bimodality) as 
measure of the coalescence of countries around the peaks in the cross-country distribution of per capita income. 
Analyzing data from 1970 to 2011, she finds a tendency for the countries of the world to converge to two 
groups which has weakened since 2000. While this approach can be criticized for conflating peaks and 
(continued) 
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of convergence clubs and, following Paap and van Dijk (1998),	 Tsionas (2000), Pittau 
(2005), and Pittau and Zelli (2006), estimate a finite mixture model of the cross-country 
income distribution. They find that it has three (data-selected) components, a result 
confirmed by Battisti and Parmeter (2013) who generalize the approach of Pittau et. al. 
(2010) and exploit the panel nature of the data set.28  
As they find little movement between the three components, Pittau et. al. (2010) interpret 
them as evidence of three basins of attraction in the growth process and note that the gap 
between the implied middle-income and high-income groups has become wider and more 
pronounced since the early 1970's. Anderson et. al. (2016) take a related approach and 
attribute the recent growth in the gap between the rich and other countries to the tendency for 
many middle income countries to fall back into the poor group. Pittau et. al. (2010) also 
present evidence of an increase in the gap between the typical poor country and the typical 
rich country. This is partly due to an increase in the gap between the mean incomes of these 
two components but, more importantly, to a decrease in the dispersion of the two groups of 
countries around their respective component means. Together, these two changes drive a 
documented rise in polarization in the cross-country income distribution. 
Epstein et. al. (2003) apply Quah's distribution dynamics methods to data from 17 OECD 
countries covering 1870-1992. While the pre-1914 and 1914-1950 periods appear to be 
characterized by persistence within the cross-country distribution of per capita incomes, 
mobility and some convergence is observed in the post-1950 period using data for the larger 
group of 24 countries available for that period. However, this gives way to some divergence 
beginning in the early 1970s. The contrast between the two eras of increased economic 
openness, 1870-1914 and post-1950, is affirmed by Di Vaio and Enflo (2011) who estimate a 
mixture model for the growth rate of per capita GDP using data from 1870-2003 for a larger 
group of countries. Their approach specifies a standard growth regression for each of the 
(data-determined) regimes with regime membership being determined stochastically, and the 
estimated coefficient on initial income being used to perform a standard (within regime) 
convergence test. 
These papers can all be considered as part of the literature that searches for evidence of 
multiple basins of attraction using various clustering algorithms.  Earlier work of that type 
includes Desdoigts (1999) and Kourtellos (2003) who use projection pursuit methods and 
find evidence of multiple steady states although, apart from the OECD countries, those in the 
former paper are closely linked to geography. Canova (2004) uses initial per capita income to 
order the OECD countries and finds that there are two clusters with an “economically large” 
implied difference in the long-run incomes and little mobility between them. 
                                                                                                                                                  
convergence clubs, it is interesting to note that the author attributes this "de-clubbing" to the rapid growth 
recently observed in some low income counties discussed in Section II above. See also Anderson et. al. (2012). 
28 See also Vollmer et. al. (2013a) and Pittau et. al. (2016). 
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A common aspect of much of the literature considered so far in this section is the use of per 
capita income as the variable defining basins of attraction on the growth process. As noted 
above, the case can be made that per capita income is not a sufficient statistic for a country’s 
initial conditions inviting the use of other variables in defining convergence clubs. For 
example, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) found that literacy rates as well as initial per capita 
income were useful in identifying convergence clubs. More recently, Tan (2010) uses a 
regression-tree method that generalizes that used in Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and 
attributes a dominant role to similarities in institutional quality and ethnic fractionalization in 
identifying countries with similar long-run behavior. Importantly, he finds no such role for 
geographic factors. Battisti and Parmeter (2013) use mixture models to model the joint 
distribution of output per capita and its proximate determinants – physical and human capital 
and TFP – and find evidence of multiple clusters. Fiaschi et. al. (2018) consider a large 
number and wide variety of possible deep determinants of variation in output per capita as 
candidates for defining growth clusters. Using a method based on the AIC they find that 
initial conditions define three clusters according to life expectancy in 1960 and the share of 
Catholics in the population in 1965. The former is considered a measure of human capital 
while the latter is considered to be a measure of culture. 
Vollmer et. al. (2013b) argue for the emergence of three “human development clubs” during 
the 1990's using a finite mixture model of the joint distribution of income per capita, 
educational attainment and life expectancy which they also conclude has three components.  
They note the coherence between these findings of three components and the recent literature 
discussing the “middle income trap” which, as Kharas and Kohli (2011) discuss, is the name 
given to the phenomenon wherein many countries experience abrupt slowdowns following 
periods of rapid growth. These countries become trapped between the low income countries, 
with whom they are unable to compete because their wage structure is too high, and the 
advanced countries, with whom they are unable to compete because their technology 
structure is not sufficiently advanced.   As Vollmer et. al. (2013b) note, the middle income 
trap may well prove to be a transitory stage of development – an example of the 
identification problem discussed by Durlauf et. al. (2005, pp 622-3). El-Gamal and Ryu 
(2012) document the appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of a “stochastically 
stable” middle income group over the 1960-2009 period. This could reflect the lack of 
stationarity in the transition dynamics that they observe, complex nonlinearities, or a 
dynamic process of higher than first order. The dynamic process followed by the cross 
country distribution of per capita income has only ever being modeled as a first-order process 
so the implied misspecification if the process is of higher order could manifest as a lack of 
stationary.  
In studying σ-convergence, another body of research has focused on the dispersion of the 
cross-country distribution of per capita incomes.29 The most commonly used measures of 
                                                
29 Durlauf et al. (2009) discuss some of the econometric issues that arise in the application of the σ-convergence 
concept. 
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dispersion are the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the log of cross 
country income (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Ben-David, 1993; and Slaughter, 
1997). However, other indices exist with interesting properties (see, Cowell, 1995), including 
spatial properties that affect measures of σ-convergence (Bode and Rey, 2006; Egger and 
Pfaffermayr, 2009). It is important to note that σ-convergence tests lack power against the 
club convergence alternative in much the same way as do β -convergence, as there is no 
reason why the dispersion of the cross-country distribution of per capita income cannot 
decline as when countries lie in two or more basins of attraction. 
The σ-convergence concept has seen a host of recent applications at the regional level but far 
fewer at the global level. Barro (2012) reports a tendency for the standard deviation of the 
logs of per capita GDP and consumption to decline since the mid-1970s for a group of mostly 
industrialized countries. Madsen and Timol (2011) use the tests of Lichtenberg (1994) and 
Carree and Klomp (1997) to examine the σ-convergence hypothesis using data on labor 
productivity in the manufacturing sectors of 19 OECD countries since 1870, and conclude 
that σ-convergence (and also β -convergence) occurred, a result that is subject to De Long's 
(1988) critique.30 Rodrik (2013) finds σ-convergence in labor productivity in the 
manufacturing sector at the two-digit level for a smaller sample of countries. The time-series 
convergence tests that allow for transition dynamics formulated by Phillips and Sul (2007a, 
2007b, 2009) can be considered as tests of σ-convergence and we discuss these below.  
The conclusion that we take away from the research on nonlinear models of growth is that, 
once the alternative hypothesis of club convergence is explicitly considered, there is strong 
evidence for a rejection of the view that initial conditions do not matter for long-run 
outcomes in favor of the view that they do and that, as a result, the cross-country distribution 
of per capita income exhibits characteristics consistent with the existence of two or more 
convergence clubs. We are, however, mindful of an important identification caveat 
emphasized by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) that needs to be attached to convergence tests: 
Given the finite spans of data available, it is impossible to unequivocally distinguish between 
a model in which there are multiple steady states and a model in which countries transition 
through different stages of development before reaching a common steady state.  
Time series models 
 
So far the evidence we presented relates to the strand of literature that focuses on country 
cross sections or panels. Next we turn attention to covering time series approaches that have 
recently been quite prevalent notwithstanding transitional data constraints. 
 
Structural Breaks 
                                                
30 See also Bernard and Jones (1996) and Wu (2009). 
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Perron (1989) shows that trend or structural breaks reduce the power of unit-root tests and 
many researchers have found that permitting structural breaks in the form of mean or trend 
shifts, either exogenously or endogenously determined, makes it less more likely that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root will be rejected.31  That is, as statistical matter, the inclusion of trend 
or structural breaks, that are often found to coincide with the Great Depression or the Second 
World War, or restricting the data used to that from the post-war period, tends to produce test 
results more favorable to the convergence hypothesis.32 
It is not clear, however, how to interpret these results, in part because the interpretation of the 
breaks is unclear. Do the breaks represent large exogenous shocks? Or are they the 
manifestation of the persistent effects of shocks? Or do they reflect un-modeled 
nonlinearities or transition dynamics in the growth process? Answering these questions 
would require a model of the growth process that allows a role for such shocks to inform the 
empirical work. Moreover, the implications of the general finding that allowing trend breaks 
reduces the tendency to not reject the unit root null hypothesis for the convergence 
hypothesis itself are also not clear. If the process for , ,i t j ty y−  is found to be stationary once a 
structural break is permitted, a conclusion of convergence is then conditional on the 
occurrence of the break. 
 
Long-memory approaches 
 
Michelacci and Zaffaroni (2000) argue that the early time series tests of convergence are 
flawed because ,i ty obeys a long-memory process which, following Granger (1980), they 
motivate by considering a Solow growth model for an economy with heterogeneous sectors.  
The original time series tests of convergence assume that ,i ty is either I(0) or I(1), perhaps 
around a deterministic trend. Fractionally differenced, I(d), models allow d, the exponent on 
the first difference operator in ARIMA representation of ,i ty , to differ from the polar cases of 
zero and one, which imply, respectively, a rapid decay in the effects of shocks or none at all. 
For0 1d< < , ,i ty is mean reverting but it exhibits “long-memory” and is more persistent that 
a standard ARMA process.33  
                                                
31 Stock (1994) surveys the literature on the relationship between structural breaks and unit-root tests.  
32 A selection of the research studying the role of structural breaks in convergence tests includes Carlino and 
Mills (1993), Oxley and Greasley (1995), Loewy and Papell (1996), Greasley and Oxley (1997), Li and Papell 
(1999), Strazicich et. al. (2004), Dawson and Sen A (2007), Dawson and Strazicich (2010), Costantini and Sen 
(2012), King and Ramlogan-Dobson (2014), and Ghoshray and Khan (2015). 
33 Specifically, if tx  is a zero mean stochastic process with the representation ( )(1 ) ( )d t tA L L x B L u− = , 
where ( )A L  and ( )B L  are lag polynomials with roots outside the unit circle and tu  is a white-noise 
process, then d can take any real value rather than being constrained to 0 or 1. For 0d = , tx is a standard 
(continued) 
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While they do not explicitly test for convergence in a long-memory framework, Michelacci 
and Zaffaroni (2000) do find evidence of long-memory behavior in output data from the 
OECD countries in the form of estimates of d between 0.5 and 1.0 which they claim is both 
consistent with the 2 percent rate of convergence commonly found in earlier cross-country 
analyses; and damaging to the reliability of unit-root tests of convergence.  
 
Silverberg and Verspagen (2003) offer a motivation for long-memory representations of 
output by suggesting that evolutionary models of economic behavior can endogenously 
generate the cross-sectional heterogeneity that drives Granger's (1980) aggregation rationale. 
They employ a variety of empirical approaches designed to overcome many of the criticisms 
of the Michelacci and Zaffaroni (2000) data analysis, and their conclusions about the 
suitability of long-memory representations of output are far more agnostic. One important 
difference between the two papers is how the trend is modeled. Michelacci and Zaffaroni 
(2000) assume a linear trend in the log of per capita incomes while Silverberg and Verspagen 
(2003) first-difference their data prior to analysis. 
 
Mean reversion in per capita incomes implies that Definition (4) above could still be 
satisfied, but standard tests of the unit root null in the , ,i t j ty y−  process will have low power 
against a long-memory alternative because of the relatively slow decay of the effects of 
shocks under the alternative hypothesis. Cunado et. al. (2006) test for convergence by 
examining the (possibly fractional) order of integration of the deviation of log per capita 
income in 14 OECD countries from that in the US: , ,i t US ty y− . Using a data set beginning in 
the late 19th century, they are unable to reject the hypothesis of a unit root for almost all 
countries but restricting the analysis to the post-war period leads to confidence intervals for d 
the lie in (.5, 1), consistent with convergence in the sense of definition (4) above, for almost 
all of the 14 countries.34 Silverberg and Verspagen (1999) report similar results. Dufrénot et. 
al. (2011) investigate the behavior of , ,i t j ty y− , where country j is a regional benchmark 
country (selected as the country in the region with the highest per capita GDP at the end of 
the sample) using post-war data on a group of 98 developing countries. They find 
considerable variation the time-series properties of , ,i t j ty y−  across countries within regions 
and across regions. Cunado et al. (2006) and Dufrénot et al. (2011) include a time trend in 
their time-series representations for  , ,i t US ty y−   and , ,i t j ty y−  which, as we discuss below, 
                                                                                                                                                  
ARMA process with short memory, but for 0 .5d< < , tx is a covariance-stationary long-memory process 
because its autocorrelation function decays hyperbolically rather than geometrically.  For .5 1d≤ < , tx  is 
also long-memory process that, while mean reverting, is no longer covariance stationary; and for 1d > , tx is 
explosive. See Baillie (1996) for a survey of fractional integration and long memory processes. 
34 That the countries for which the unit root cannot be rejected in the post-war period are Austria, Germany, and 
Japan may underscore the importance of transition dynamics as we discuss below. 
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permits some transition dynamics but apparently does not increase the power of their tests. 
For example, Cunado et al (2006)'s confidence intervals for d for the entire sample are little 
changed by the introduction of intercept and trend terms while those for the post-war data 
become wider. 
 
To avoid the problem of choosing a benchmark country, Stengos and Yazgan (2014) follow 
Peseran (2007) in considering pairwise convergence by examining the value of d for all 
possible values of , ,i t j ty y−  for 139 countries in the post-war period. They find 0.5d >  but 
cite a “lack of power” in concluding that the distinction between I(0) and I(1) processes 
adequately describes the behavior of log per capita output levels. That is, they conclude 
against convergence despite allowing for smooth structural breaks by including a Fourier 
function of time in the representation for , ,i t j ty y− . Stengos et. al. (2016) take a multivariate 
approach to the estimation of d and find stronger evidence of mean reversion (i.e.0.5 1d< < ) 
and hence convergence than Stengos and Yazgan (2014). 
 
While the finding that data from the post-war period is more likely to be favorable to the 
convergence hypothesis than data over from the first half of the 20th Century is noteworthy, 
one difficulty in interpreting these results is the inclusion of trends (Cunado et al., 2006); 
Dufrénot et al., 2011) and trend breaks (Stengos and Yazgan, 2014; Stengos et al., 2016) or 
first differences (Silverberg and Verspagen, 1999) in the representations for the income gaps 
which have an undocumented effect on the results and raises the same sorts of issues as the 
trend-break literature discussed above. Further complicating matters, Diebold and Inoue 
(2001) show that, as a matter of theory, apparent long memory can be the manifestation of 
some types of structural change in I(0) or I(1) processes and Granger and Hyung (2004) 
show that distinguishing between fractionally integrated processes and processes with 
occasional breaks can be difficult.   
 
Another concern with this literature is the lack of strong theoretical reasons to believe that 
per capita outputs obey fractionally integrated processes. Michelacci and Zaffaroni (2000) 
and Silverberg and Verspagen (2003) suggest reasons why fractionally integrated processes 
might arise from growth models, whereas Lau (1999) shows that integrated and cointegrated 
processes arise naturally under in a wide class of growth models. 
 
Transition dynamics 
 
As Bernard and Durlauf acknowledge, tests based on the co-integration of cross country 
income levels are more appropriately regarded as tests that convergence has occurred, than 
tests that convergence is occurring. It is possible, for example, that the expected difference in 
two countries' log per capita incomes at any time t T+ , ( ), ,i t T j t T tE y y F+ +−  includes a 
deterministic term 0t Tµ + ≠ where lim 0t TT µ +→∞ =  so that convergence definition (4) above is 
satisfied despite a contemporary non-zero expected difference in incomes because at least 
one of the countries has not yet reached its steady state. Data generated by such a process 
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may be less likely to produce a rejection of a unit root null hypothesis in the , ,i t j ty y−  process 
if 1t tµ µ+ ≈  because convergence is slow as the difference in incomes will then have a highly 
persistent component.    
 
Oxley and Greasley (1995) add a time trend to the representation for , ,i t j ty y−  which, 
omitting higher order lagged terms, they write as , , , 1 , 1( )i t j t i t j t ty y y y tµ α β ε− −− = + − + + . 
They define long-run convergence as 1α <  and 0β =  (although to satisfy Definition (4) 
above 0µ = is also necessary) while 1α <  and 0β ≠ is defined as “catching-up”. Using data 
for the US, UK, and Australian economies from the late 19th to the late 20th centuries, and 
allowing for the possibility of discontinuities in the trend, they find a role for the catch up 
term for the US/UK and US/Australia pairs but not for the UK/Australia pair which they 
conclude have converged. Chong et. al. (2008) estimate a non-linear version of this model 
using post-war data on  , ,i t US ty y−  where i is an OECD country. For those 12 countries with 
apparently non-linear income gaps to the US, the unit-root null is not rejected in eight cases 
suggesting that transition dynamics per se are not the entire reason for the rejections of 
convergence found in time series-tests. King and Ramlogan-Dobson (2013) find that 
allowing for breaks in the trend function that captures the transition dynamics weakens the 
statistical case against convergence found using this approach. 
 
A related approach is taken by Nahar and Inder (2002) who model the deviation of per capita 
output in country i  from that in the US  at time t , , ,i t US ty y− , as a polynomial in t  and test 
the hypothesis that the derivative of the polynomial with respect to t  is zero against that 
alternative that it is positive which implies that country i  is catching up to the US. Bentzen 
(2005) modifies this approach to allow the rate of convergence to vary over the sample 
period. While this approach does highlight the possible richness of transition paths for 
different countries, it specifies the non-convergence null hypothesis as the overly restrictive 
requirement that , ,i t US ty y− is an i.i.d. random variable so it is not clear how this test performs 
when the non-convergence of , ,i t US ty y− causes it to follow an integrated process. Datta's 
(2003) time-varying parameter approach to modeling transition dynamics also finds evidence 
of catching up using post-war data from the OECD countries but is subject to a similar 
criticism.  
 
Phillips and Sul (2007a, 2007b, 2009) present a time-series test of convergence that allows 
for substantial cross-country heterogeneity in the transition dynamics. They write ,i t it ty b µ=
where tµ is the hypothesized steady-state growth path common to all counties and itb
describes the transition path of economy i to the steady state growth path. Convergence is 
said to occur if lim 1itt h→∞ = for all i where , ,1 1
n n
it i t i t it iti i
h ny y nb b
= =
= =∑ ∑ . Phillips and Sul 
then propose testing for convergence by specifying a model of the transition path that yields 
a test based on a conventional one-sided t-test of the hypothesis 0γ = (no convergence) 
against the alternative 0γ > (convergence) in the regression 
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1log 2log(log ) log t
t
H t a t u
H
γ− = + + , where 1 2
1
( 1)nt itiH n h
−
=
= −∑ .35 They show that γ  is 
twice the speed of convergence and that, when tµ  follows a random walk with drift or trend 
stationary process, 0 2γ< < implies convergence in growth rates (conditional convergence) 
while 2 γ≤  implies convergence in levels (absolute convergence), that is in the sense of 
Definition (4) above. Phillips and Sul (2009) apply this test to data from the US States, the 
Western OECD countries, and 152 countries from the PWT and, consistent with much of the 
literature, find evidence of convergence in growth rates, but not in levels, for the US states 
(1929-1998) and the Western OECD countries (1870-2001 and 1940-2001 but not 1870-1929 
nor 1911-1970) nor for the PWT countries.  
 
Clustering Approaches 
 
There have also been some applications of clustering approaches in the time series context to 
check for club convergence. Phillips and Sul (2007a) develop a clustering algorithm designed 
to divide the countries in a data set into groups less heterogeneous than the sample as a whole 
and then to test for convergence within groups using the method described above. Having 
rejected convergence for the 1970-2003 sample of 152 PWT countries, Phillips and Sul 
(2008) apply this approach to that data set and conclude that it can be split into four 
convergence clubs (three of which exhibit growth rate or conditional convergence) and a 
small group of diverging countries.36 Finding between two and five convergence clubs is 
common and consistent with the results of those who've studied the evolution of the cross-
country distribution of per capita income such as Pittau et. al (2010).  
By contrast, Beylunioglu et. al. (2016) extend Peseran's (2007) pair-wise time series 
approach using a "maximal clique" approach that, like that of Hobijn and Frances (2000), is 
also based on time-series convergence concepts, and finds a large number of very small 
clusters that the authors call "convergence clubs". While these results are evidence against 
convergence the large number of clusters found makes the convergence clubs interpretation 
difficult to sustain. Moreover, it is likely that the groups found reflect countries between 
which convergence has occurred rather than those between which convergence is occurring. 
A test along these lines that also took into account transition dynamics would, no doubt, 
produce fewer groups as do, for example, Phillips and Sul (2008). 
                                                
35 Observe that 1
1
1n itin h
−
=
=∑  so that tH is the sample variance of ith  implying that the Phillips and Sul 
approach may also be considered as a test of  σ -convergence. 
36 The memberships of the clubs different from those found by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) using a regression 
tree algorithm on data from 98 countries for 1960-85 from an antecedent to the PWT but it is not clear whether 
these differences can be attributed to the different number of countries, the different time periods, or the 
different clustering algorithm. 
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Our reading of the recent time-series tests of the convergence hypothesis is broadly in accord 
with that of the non-linear cross-section studies of the hypothesis discussed above. While 
there may be some weak support for the proposition that gaps between per capita income 
levels have fallen in some groups of countries in the post-war period, the interpretation of 
whatever support that there is for the convergence hypothesis is fraught with difficulty 
because of the lack of consensus about how to treat the trends in the data and, in particular, 
for the meaning for convergence of the structural and trend breaks that are often found. 
Importantly, as we observed above, once the alternative hypothesis of convergence clubs is 
considered by use of a clustering algorithm, there is evidence in favor of that view that is 
consistent with that found using other clustering approaches.  
Cross-individual distribution of income 
Beyond the analysis of the rich literature presented above that is based on country 
convergence – unit of analysis being the country - recent work attempts to assess global 
inequality by considering the distribution of incomes of individual households from different 
countries around the globe. The advantage of a global approach lies in the detail with which 
we can observe and analyze the effects of globalization in different segments of the global 
income distribution. These studies combine micro and macro data coming from hundreds of 
household surveys from over 100 countries in the world, covering more than 90 percent of 
the world population and income. Advocates of this approach argue that using individuals or 
households rather than countries as units of analysis, is more useful if one is concerned about 
human welfare because different countries have different population sizes. As stated by Sala-
i-Martin (2006), “After all, there is no reason to down-weight the well-being of a Chinese 
peasant relative to a Senegalese farmer just because the population in China is larger than 
that of Senegal.” 
Excellent examples on world income distribution and global inequality include Milanovic’s 
early paper (1997) that lays down many of the issues discussed by the subsequent literature, 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), Atkinson and Brandolini (2004), Sala-i-Martin (2006), 
Deaton (2010), Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2014), Atkinson (2015), Bourguignon (2015), 
Lakner and Milanovic (2015).  
 
Branko Milanovic’s recent book Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of 
Globalization (2016a) may well summarize the most current thinking on global inequality. 
Milanovic’s book, like Bourguignon’s (The Globalisation of Inequality, 2015), concludes 
with one key fact: while inequality is rising within most countries, notably the high-income 
ones, global inequality of incomes, though huge, has been falling, particularly since 2000. 
This comes as no surprise given the millions of Chinese lifted from poverty during China’s 
historic growth acceleration of the last three decades discussed previously. Yet many 
economists argue that this positive trend might not continue, once global favourable 
conditions slow down and as China’s wages rise further. Prospects would depend on whether 
China’s economic progress can be replicated and African or other Asian nations (e.g. India, 
Bangladesh, Vietnam) can follow suit.  
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Another interesting fact from Milanovic’s work is illustrated in Figure 8 showing the 
proportional rise in real per capita incomes across the world income distribution between 
1988 to 2011. Income is measured in 2005 international dollars and individuals are ranked by 
their real household per capita income. On the one hand, points A and C on the cumulative 
distribution plot reflect large real income gains made by individuals around the global 
median, and by those who are part of the global top 1 percent, respectively. On the other 
hand, those at the bottom part of the distribution have done relatively poorly, and those 
between the 80th and 95th percentiles have seen stagnant real incomes (point B). In the 
words of Milanovic (2016b), “The people around the global median are, however, still 
relatively poor by Western standards. This emerging ‘global middle class’ is composed of 
individuals with household per capita incomes of between 5 and 15 international dollars per 
day. The contrast between the unambiguous success of people at point A and the relative 
failure of people at point B allows us to look at the effects of globalization more broadly.”  
 
Angus Deaton in his book, The Great Escape (2013), offers a novel insight on global 
inequality. He argues that the world is a better place than it used to be but that the enormous 
progress that resulted in catching up of some countries was also responsible for opening up 
gaps and setting the stage for today's disproportionately unequal world. In the words of 
Deaton “… the escape from destitution by so many has left gaping inequalities between 
people and nations.”  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In its simplest form, convergence suggests that poor countries have the propensity to grow 
faster than the rich so to eventually catch up to them. The idea of convergence has its formal 
origins in Solow (1956) but its empirical treatment really begins in the mid-80’s being further 
motivated by the modern growth theory and empirics; it remains today a perennial research 
topic although only, perhaps, under the new lamppost of global inequality.  
 
The voluminous literature that has emerged seeking answers to the convergence question is a 
testimony to the interest that the hypothesis has generated – a crude internet search reveals 
that over the last 30 years there have been thousands of papers written on the subject; in 
addition, four of the most influential papers in the growth literature focus on convergence 
and account for almost 11,000 citations (according to Google scholar).37 Despite the concept 
of the long-run irrelevance of initial conditions being straightforward, empirically testing  
convergence and understanding its mechanics proved quite elusive. As shown in this survey, 
convergence is hard to pin down, first, because the concept can be operationalized in many 
ways and second, because econometric approaches and data measurement issues remain a 
challenge in empirical tests of convergence. Ultimately, understanding convergence would 
                                                
37 As of October 24, 2016, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) 4,262 citations; Baumol (1986) 3,939; De Long 
(1988) 1,464; and Bernard and Durlauf (1996) 1,188. 
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get us closer to understanding the process of economic growth – a truly humbling endeavor.  
So, what is the evidence on convergence and what have we learned from it thus far?  
 
With the exception of some early studies that have been criticized extensively due to 
econometric problems, there is a broad consensus of no evidence supporting absolute 
convergence in cross-country per capita incomes – that is poor countries do not seem to be 
unconditionally catching up to rich ones. The only glimmer of hope for this hypothesis is 
provided by Rodrik's (2013) finding of unconditional convergence in particular 
manufacturing industries. Of course, whether this result will hold up to the scrutiny of 
subsequent researchers, armed with more sophisticated methods and better data, is unknown.   
 
A more definitive conclusion from this survey is that the process of growth and so, 
potentially, of convergence, is not smooth but rather start and stop, and is characterized by 
significant country heterogeneity. Such realization must not come as a surprise given that the 
notion of convergence is only a theoretical construction that characterizes part of the broader 
dynamic growth process across countries. Under such a framework, it is then possible that 
several mechanisms of divergence and convergence are concurrently at work across countries 
in different stages of their development process. For example, the divergence process may 
tend to dominate the convergence process at early stages of economic growth while the 
reverse could hold true for later stages (Steger, 2006, and World Economic Outlook, 2017, 
make a similar observation). In this regard, exploring those mechanisms which induce 
convergence and those which result in non-convergence or divergence would be central to 
understanding such phenomena. Also, focusing attention to potential mechanisms that 
determine growth dynamics (linear and nonlinear) or the distribution of global inequality, as 
it is done in recent studies, maybe more tenable and informative than seeking evidence on 
convergence. 
 
Our reading of the evidence, then, is that recent optimism in favor of rapid and sustainable 
convergence is unfounded. The last two decades of an unprecedented wave of growth in 
many LICs and emerging markets led to many analysts claiming prematurely, in our view, 
success with slogans such as “lions on the move,” “the next convergence,” and “no shortage 
of economic growth in Africa” (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Spence, 2011; Economist, 
2013, respectively). Many observers are led to believe that “this time is different.” We have 
come to the conclusion that with the exception of a few countries in Asia which exhibited 
transformational growth, most of the economic achievements in developing economies have 
been the result of removing inefficiencies, especially in governance and in political 
institutions. But as is now well known these are merely one-off level effects that, while not 
unimportant, and in fact necessary in the process of development, nonetheless do not 
stimulate ongoing economic growth.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Decadal average per capital GDP growth (%) by geographical region 
Geographical	Region	 1960s	 1970s	 1980s	 1990s	 2000s	
East	Asia	&	Pacific	 3.9	 3.3	 3.2	 3.0	 3.6	
Europe	&	Central	Asia	 4.7	 3.5	 1.8	 0.5	 3.6	
Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 2.2	 2.7	 -0.6	 1.5	 2.2	
Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 3.7	 2.7	 -0.9	 2.0	 2.0	
North	America	 3.1	 2.5	 1.9	 1.8	 0.9	
South	Asia	 1.6	 1.4	 2.1	 0.5	 4.5	
Sub-Saharan	Africa	 1.8	 1.3	 -0.2	 -0.4	 1.8	
            
World	 2.8	 2.4	 0.6	 0.9	 2.7	
Source:	Penn	World	Tables	version	7.1	 	 	 	 	
 
 
Table 2: Decadal average per capita GDP growth (%) by income and exporter groups	
		 1960s	 1970s	 1980s	 1990s	 2000s	
Income	Group	
     HIC	 4.7	 3.3	 2.4	 2.1	 1.7	
MIC	 2.8	 3.4	 0.4	 1.4	 3.4	
LIC		(all)	 1.4	 0.7	 -0.2	 -0.5	 2.4	
					LIC	(fragile)	 1.7	 0.7	 -0.5	 -1.5	 1.3	
					LIC	(non-fragile)	 1.1	 0.7	 0.2	 0.6	 3.6	
      Exporter	Group	
     Commodity	Exporters	 2.1	 2.0	 -0.8	 -0.4	 3.0	
Others	 3.0	 2.5	 1.1	 1.3	 2.7	
            
World	 2.8	 2.4	 0.6	 0.9	 2.7	
Source:	Penn	World	Tables	version	7.1.	
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Table 4: Number of years required for selected low-income 
countries to achieve middle-income status 
Country	 Year	
Vietnam	 2.5	
Lao	 3.7	
Moldova	 6.5	
Sudan	 7.6	
Cambodia	 9.5	
Ghana	 13.1	
Kyrgyzstan	 14.4	
Papua	New	Guinea	 14.8	
Tajikistan	 18.1	
Nigeria	 20.0	
Nicaragua	 22.0	
Bangladesh	 24.9	
Mauritania	 27.2	
Liberia	 28.7	
Rwanda	 33.9	
Uganda	 36.5	
Nepal	 43.0	
Senegal	 46.2	
Cameroon	 47.7	
Mali	 50.9	
Burkina	Faso	 51.7	
Malawi	 86.8	
Gambia	 90.0	
Congo	 95.6	
Benin	 118.0	
Sierra	Leone	 120.1	
Haiti	 149.5	
Guinea	 228.9	
Niger	 734.3	
Source:	Penn	World	Tables	version	7.1.	
Note:	Future	growth	projections	are	based	on	the	average	per	capita		
GDP	growth	over	the	period	1995-2010.	Countries	with	negative	growth	
rates	1995-2010	are	not	reported.	
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Decade
1960
Guatemala 1962 Hong	Kong 1965
Indonesia 1967 Morocco 1963
Korea 1962 Togo 1969
Pakistan 1960 Zambia 1968
Portugal 1967
1970
Bangladesh 1975 Austria 1979
Cameroon 1973 Belgium 1974
China 1977 Botswana 1973
Ecuador 1970 Cameroon 1978
Egypt 1976 Cote	d`Ivoire 1978
Gabon 1971 Ecuador 1978
Mauritius 1971 El	Salvador 1978
Paraguay 1973 France 1974
Vietnam 1975 Gabon 1976
Greece 1973
Hungary 1978
Indonesia 1973
Iran 1976
Israel 1973
Italy 1974
Jamaica 1972
Japan 1970
Mauritius 1977
Poland 1979
Portugal 1973
Romania 1978
Spain 1974
Swaziland 1975
Switzerland 1970
Tanzania 1971
1980
Cambodia 1982 Albania 1988
El	Salvador 1984 Brazil 1980
Guatemala 1987 Bulgaria 1988
Iran 1981 Cameroon 1984
Jamaica 1980 Egypt 1984
Tanzania 1985 Guatemala 1980
Uganda 1988 Mexico 1981
Paraguay 1980
Romania 1987
South	Africa 1980
Trinidad	&Tobago 1980
1990
Albania 1992 Eritrea 1998
Angola 1993 Japan 1991
Bangladesh 1996 Korea 1996
Bulgaria 1997 Kuwait 1993
Cameroon 1994 Norway 1998
Czech	Republic 1992 Sierra	Leone 1994
Ireland 1993 Slovak	Republic 1990
Kazakhstan 1998 Tajikistan 1999
Kyrgyzstan 1995 Tanzania 1990
Liberia 1996 Thailand 1995
Moldova 1994
Mozambique 1995
Poland 1991
Romania 1992
Serbia 1993
Sierra	Leone 1999
Slovak	Republic 1992
South	Africa 1993
Tajikistan 1997
Tanzania 1997
Trinidad	&Tobago 1993
Turkmenistan 1995
Uzbekistan 1994
Zambia 1994
2000
Ethiopia 2003 Ireland 2003
India 2002 Kazakhstan 2006
Kazakhstan 2000 Liberia 2000
Laos 2004
Mongolia 2002
Uzbekistan 2003
Table	5:	Growth	breaks	by	decade
Accelerations Decelerations
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Source:	Penn	World	Tables	version	7.1	based	on	balanced	sample	of	countries.	
Countries	with	population	below	1	million	were	dropped	from	the	sample.	 		 		 		 		 		 		
 
Figure 2b.  Log of per capita income by income group (1960-2010) 
	
Source:	Penn	World	Tables	version	7.1	based	on	balanced	sample	of	countries.	
Countries	with	population	below	1	million	were	dropped	from	the	sample.	
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Figure 3.  Income levels relative to the US (1960-2010) 
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Figure 4. Growth against initial income  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Cross-country income distribution against log per capita GPD (1960, 2010) 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Cross-country income dispersion (1960-2010) 
 
 
Figure 7a. Correlations of per capita GDP growth in consecutive decades (all countries) 
 
Figure 7b. Correlations of per capita GDP growth in consecutive decades (LICs) 
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Figure 8. Cumulative real per capita income growth at various percentiles of the global 
income distribution (1988–2011) 
 
        Source:	Milanovic	(2016a) 
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
 
 
High	Income	
Countries
(29	countries)
Australia Albania Lebanon Afghanistan Nepal
Austria Algeria Libya Armenia Nicaragua
Belgium Angola Lithuania Bangladesh Niger
Canada Argentina Macedonia Benin Nigeria
Cyprus Azerbaijan Malaysia Bolivia Papua	New	Guinea
Czech	Republic Bahrain Mauritius Burkina	Faso Rwanda
Denmark Belarus Mexico Burundi Senegal
Finland Botswana Morocco Cambodia Sierra	Leone
France Brazil Namibia Cameroon Sudan
Germany Bulgaria Oman Central	African	Republic Tajikistan
Greece Chile Pakistan Chad Tanzania
Hong	Kong China Panama Congo,	Dem.	Rep. Timor-Leste
Ireland Colombia Paraguay Congo,	Republic	of Togo
Israel Costa	Rica Peru Cote	d`Ivoire Uganda
Italy Croatia Philippines Eritrea Vietnam
Japan Dominican	Republic Poland Gambia,	The Zambia
Korea,	Republic	of Ecuador Romania Georgia Zimbabwe
Netherlands Egypt Russia Ghana
New	Zealand El	Salvador Saudi	Arabia Guinea
Norway Estonia Serbia Guinea-Bissau
Portugal Ethiopia South	Africa Haiti
Singapore Gabon Sri	Lanka Honduras
Slovak	Republic Guatemala Swaziland Kenya
Slovenia Hungary Syria Kyrgyzstan
Spain India Thailand Lao
Sweden Indonesia Trinidad	&Tobago Lesotho
Switzerland Iran Tunisia Liberia
United	Kingdom Iraq Turkey Madagascar
United	States Jamaica Turkmenistan Malawi
Jordan Ukraine Mali
Kazakhstan United	Arab	Emirates Mauritania
Kuwait Uruguay Moldova
Latvia Uzbekistan Mongolia
Venezuela Mozambique
Middle	Income	Countries Low	Income	Countries
(68	countries) (51	countries)
Table	A.1:	Country	classifications	-	by	income	groups
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Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia Latin America & Caribbean Europe & Central Asia
(41 countries) (6 Countries) (21 countries) (44 countries)
Angola Afghanistan Argentina Albania
Benin Bangladesh Bolivia Armenia
Botswana India Brazil Austria
Burkina Faso Nepal Chile Azerbaijan
Burundi Pakistan Colombia Belarus
Cameroon Sri Lanka Costa Rica Belgium
Central African Republic Dominican Republic Bulgaria
Chad North America Ecuador Croatia
Congo, Dem. Rep. of (2 countries) El Salvador Cyprus
Congo, Rep. Canada Guatemala Czech Republic
Cote d'Ivoire United States Haiti Denmark
Eritrea Honduras Estonia
Ethiopia Middle East & North Africa Jamaica Finland
Gabon (16 countries) Mexico France
Gambia, The Algeria Nicaragua Georgia
Ghana Bahrain Panama Germany
Guinea Egypt, Arab Rep. Paraguay Greece
Guinea-Bissau Iran, Islamic Rep. Peru Hungary
Kenya Iraq Trinidad and Tobago Ireland
Lesotho Israel Uruguay Italy
Liberia Jordan Venezuela, RB Kazakhstan
Madagascar Kuwait Kyrgyzstan
Malawi Lebanon Latvia
Mali Libya East Asia & Pacific Lithuania
Mauritania Morocco (17 countries) Macedonia, FYR
Mauritius Oman Australia Moldova
Mozambique Saudi Arabia Cambodia Netherlands
Namibia Syrian Arab Republic China Norway
Niger Tunisia Hong Kong, China Poland
Nigeria United Arab Emirates Indonesia Portugal
Rwanda Japan Romania
Senegal Korea, Rep. Russian Federation
Sierra Leone Lao PDR Serbia
South Africa Malaysia Slovak Republic
Sudan Mongolia Slovenia
Swaziland New Zealand Spain
Tanzania Papua New Guinea Sweden
Togo Philippines Switzerland
Uganda Singapore Tajikistan
Zambia Thailand Turkey
Zimbabwe Vietnam Turkmenistan
Timor Leste Ukraine
United Kingdom
Uzbekistan
Table A1: Country classifications - by geographical regions (continued)
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Afghanistan Kenya Algeria Mali
Angola Liberia Angola Mauritania
Burundi Mauritania Azerbaijan Mongolia
Cameroon Nepal Bahrain Mozambique
Central	African	Republic Niger Burkina	Faso Namibia
Chad Nigeria Burundi Nigeria
Congo,	Dem.	Rep. Pakistan Chad Oman
Congo,	Republic	of Papua	New	Guinea Chile Papua	New	Guinea
Cote	d`Ivoire Rwanda Congo,	Dem.	Rep. Russia
Eritrea Sierra	Leone Congo,	Republic	of Saudi	Arabia
Gambia,	The Sudan Ecuador Sierra	Leone
Guinea Timor-Leste Gabon Sudan
Guinea-Bissau Togo Guinea Timor-Leste
Haiti Uganda Guinea-Bissau Trinidad	&Tobago
Iraq Zimbabwe Iran Turkmenistan
Iraq United	Arab	Emirates
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan
Kuwait Venezuela
Libya Zambia
Malawi Zimbabwe
Commodity	Exporters
(40	countries)
Fragile	States
(30	countries)
Table	A.1:	Country	classifications	(continued)
